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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the effects of product recalls on shareholder wealth 
of manufacturing firms in different supply chains. Previous research examining this phenomenon is 
largely uni-sectorial and/or does not consider the interplay of hazard, recall strategy and sector.  By 
utilizing the event study method, this study examines investors’ reactions to key product recall 
characteristics: industry, recall strategy and hazard level, on a cross-industry sample of 296 product 
recall announcements. The results show a significant negative reaction of share values to product 
recalls and significant differences between industry type and hazard levels. More regulated and 
stringent supply chains, such as the automotive and pharmaceutical, showed statistically significant 
losses in share price. The results show that industry sector and level of hazard associated with defective 
products are significant factors impacting the shareholder wealth of manufacturing firms. Contrary to 
some studies, the impact of recall strategy was not confirmed, although proactive recall strategies led, 
in some cases, to an increase in share price. Further research would benefit from more detailed 
investigation of recall strategies on the value of companies in specific sectors, particularly ones which 
are susceptible to frequent and costly product recalls.   
 
Keywords: product recall, cross-industry sector, shareholder wealth, event study, product hazard, 
recall strategy, reverse logistics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A product recall is the act of requesting the return of a batch or an entire production run of a 
commercial product, usually because of a defect, safety concern, or efficiency problem. It is an 
example of crisis caused by product-harm and is defined by Dawar and Pillutla (2000, p. 215) as a: 
“discrete, well-publicised occurrence wherein products are found to be defective or dangerous”.  
Product recalls transcend supply chains and can have significant negative effects for firms and 
their supply chain partners. The Japanese company Takata, in 2016, recalled 35 to 40 million airbags, 
due to the explosion risk they posed to drivers and passengers. The airbags have so far been linked to at 
least 10 deaths in the US. The total number of faulty airbags in the US alone exceeds 69 million, 
according to The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA), a burden big enough to 
result in Takata’s bankruptcy  (Money CNN, 2017). Further, in complex supply chains, recalls can be 
pervasive. In 2013, for example, Europe encountered what was to become known as the “horsemeat 
scandal”, when horsemeat was discovered in a wide range of ‘beef’ products. The effect was supply 
chain-wide, leading to food manufacturers, retailers and restaurant chains across Britain, Ireland, 
France, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway recalling an ever increasing range of food 
products containing traces of horse DNA (BBC News, 2013).  
Recalls can adversely affect firm’s performance (Chang et al., 2015), reduce brand equity, damage 
its reputation, cause panic among consumers, result in revenue and market share losses (Laufer and 
Coombs, 2006; Van Heerde et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2009) and cause an extensive amount of product 
returns (Genchev et al., 2011). While the long-term effects of supply chain disruptions, including 
product recalls on a firm’s brand, reputation or future revenues, are difficult to estimate (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2005a, Zhao et al., 2013), estimating the short-term impact on shareholder wealth is possible 
using event study methodology (cf. Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; Eilert et al., 2017). The key premise 
behind this methodology is that an efficient market reacts instantaneously to an event (in our case a 
product recall announcement), that could change a stock price evaluation (Brown and Warner, 1985; 
MacKinlay, 1997).  
To date, the relationship between product recall announcements and shareholder wealth, using 
event study methodology, has been examined, but studies are limited in their scope and inconclusive 
regarding the levels of impact. Product recalls have been studied: a) in isolation of factors that 
influence the magnitude and directionality of investors’ reactions (e.g. Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; 
Govindaraj et al., 2004); and/or b) where influencing factors – such as industry sector, recall strategies 
or hazard – have been considered, but have been examined in specific supply chains or product 
categories (e.g. retail focus by Ni et al., 2014) or geographical samples (e.g. the Chinese market only 
by Zhao et al., 2013).   
In order to extend our understanding of the short-term financial impact of product recalls, we 
employed the event study methodology on a global, cross-industry sample of 296 product recall 
announcements, spanning over a period of ten years. In doing so, we examine both; a) the relationship 
between product recall announcements and investors’ reactions and b) the effects of three influencing 
factors: supply chain sector, recall strategy and hazard.   
This study makes two key contributions: first, it extends our understanding of product recall 
announcements on shareholder wealth in a global, cross-supply chain context, which has not been done 
to date; second, it provides a more granular insight into the effects that industry, recall strategy and 
hazard have on the magnitude and directionality of investors’ reactions. 
In the next section we introduce the theoretical background and develop the research hypotheses. 
This is followed by the method employed in the research. We then present the results of the study, 
followed by the discussion. Finally, we close the paper with conclusions and managerial implications. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
By drawing on inter-disciplinary literature from supply chain management, marketing, economics 
and finance, we develop in this section a series of testable hypotheses, beginning with a financial 
impact of product recalls.  
2.1.  Financial Impact of Product Recalls 
Studies examining the short-term impact of product recalls on manufacturers’ share price have 
been largely uni-sectorial. Manufacturers in automotive supply chains have been the focus of studies by 
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985); Hoffer et al. (1987); Bromiley and Marcus (1989); Govindaraj et al. 
(2004); Chen et al. (2009); Zhao et al. (2013), pharmaceutical industry  by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985); 
Pruitt and Peterson (1986); Ahmed et al. (2002); Zhao et al. (2013), with a few examining other 
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industries, such as, electronics, food, consumer goods and toys respectively (e.g. Pruitt and Peterson, 
1986; Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001; Chen et al., 2009).  
In general terms, firms that experience supply chain glitches report on average 6.92% lower sales 
growth, 10.66% higher growth in cost, and 13.88% higher growth in inventories (Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2005b). The extant studies show that product recall announcements result in the decline of the 
affected firm’s stock price. For example, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) showed that in both the 
pharmaceutical and automotive industries, shareholders experienced financial losses that exceeded the 
direct costs of recalling faulty drugs and automobiles. Zhao et al. (2013), showed that the Chinese stock 
market also reacts significantly negatively to product recall announcements. A similar conclusion about 
the negative impact of product returns on shareholder wealth was drawn by Ni et al. (2014), in their 
study of retailers.   
However, the extant research is equivocal that the stock market regards a product recall as 
negative; moreover, there is a lack of consensus about the magnitude of the markets’ reaction. These 
estimates range from -0.4% (Thomsen and Mackenzie, 2001) to -10.57% (Govindaraj et al., 2004). 
Given the above, we hypothesize: 
H1: A product recall announcement will generate a negative stock market reaction. 
2.2. Effect of industry 
Beyond the impact of product recalls on shareholders’ wealth, we are interested in more specific 
factors that can influence the stock market’s reaction. To date, research has generally examined the 
impact of product recalls on shareholder wealth using single industry samples, within which the 
automotive supply chains dominate (e.g. Hoffer et al., 1987; Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Govindaraj 
et al., 2004). The few studies that utilized multi-industry samples, did not test the effects of industry 
(e.g. Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986), or tested them in a particular geography 
such as China (Zhao et al., 2013). We anticipate that investors’ reactions to product recall 
announcements will vary based on: 
• Product lifecycles, cash-to-cash cycles and Return on Investment (ROI) periods differ between 
sectors. For example, in Pharmaceutical supply chains, a substantial upfront Research and 
Development (R&D) investment spanning anywhere between ten to fifteen years is needed 
before a drug is launched on a market.  The R&D processes are stringent and must be agreed 
by the regulatory bodies before the drug can be launched (Ahmed et al., 2002; Di Masi et al., 
2016).  If successful, the drug will be marketed over a long period of time to recover the 
investment, before patent expiration and generics take significant market share. If an issue is 
found in a drug, it may be recalled and there could be a lengthy period before the drug re-
enters the market. A drug may be ‘withdrawn’ rather than being simply recalled, if an 
associated health hazard is linked with it.  As a consequence, a company will not only have 
difficulties in recovering the upfront investment, but it may also have to absorb costs related 
to law suits in case of significant health hazard for consumers. In the food sector, while health 
hazards to consumers may be similar (e.g. food poisoning resulting in severe illness), a food 
product can be recalled and replaced with a new product once the problem is discovered, 
without significant long-term additional costs. In the automotive supply chains, although a 
product recall may be associated with hazard, it can normally be rectified quickly through 
dealerships replacing defective parts. Even if an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
has to redesign a part, this would take significantly less time than changing, for example, a 
compound in a medicine, nor would it result in a withdrawal of a particular car from the 
market.  
• The frequency and value per claim of product recalls vary between industries. According to 
Allianz Insurance report, which examined latest trends in product recalls (Allianz Global 
Corporate and Speciality, 2017), automotive industry leads in terms of recall frequency - and 
it is responsible for 42% of all claims - followed by food/beverage (18%) and domestic 
appliances (10%).  Automotive industry also leads in average product recall claim value, with 
EUR 2.12 million, followed by food/beverage at EUR 1.31 million and IT/Electronics with 
EUR 1.1 million. Comparatively, in pharmaceutical sector, the announcements are less 
frequent, due to the stringent testing and regulations in place (Narayana et al., 2014). In 
consequence, investors will factor both frequency and value of product recalls into their 
valuations and react differently to announcements in different industries.  
• Industries also vary in terms of the ubiquitousness of their products. For example, food is a 
necessity rather than a luxury. Consequently, a significantly larger number of people can be 
affected by defective food, than, for example, by a defective toy. Also, as Zhao et al. (2013) 
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argued, the effect of bad food on the health of consumers is almost instantaneous, which is 
rarely the case with a defective car. Moreover, brand loyalty and availability of substitutes 
plays an important role in a market’s reaction to product defects (Rhee and Haunschild, 
2008). We posit that brand loyalty is much lower in the food industry compared to the 
automotive, and the choice of substitutes is higher. This postulation was evident in the 2013 
European horsemeat contaminated beef burgers scandal. Tesco, the UK’s largest supermarket, 
recorded a reduction in their overall sales ranging from -5.5% in the UK to -13% in Turkey 
(Leach, 2013).  
 
This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The reduction in stock price related to product recalls will have industry specific impacts. 
2.3. Effect of Recall Strategy  
In line with Zhao et al. (2013), we adopt Signalling theory to examine the impact of recall strategy 
and hazard in a product recall. Signalling theory is concerned with reducing information asymmetry 
between two parties and the description of behaviours when two parties (e.g. individuals or 
organisations) have access to different information (Spence, 2002). The theory hypothesises that a 
receiver (e.g. an investor and/or a consumer), interprets a signal from a sender (e.g. a firm that 
discovered a product defect) about the quality of a product and the firm’s intent. The availability and 
clarity of information affects the decision making process. Individuals make decisions based on 
publically available information, as well as private information, which is available only to a subset of 
the public (Connelly et al., 2011).  
In the context of product recalls, Chen et al. (2009), show that during a product recall crisis, 
information asymmetry (i.e. difference in the access to the same information) between firms, 
consumers and stock market investors, increases. Normally, through their traceability systems (Dai et 
al., 2015), firms possess significantly more information about a product recall than the stock market or 
consumers. Conversely, the stock market relies on multiple external sources of information, such as 
corporate or governmental announcements and the business press, to analyse a firm’s actions and 
strategies, and to interpret those signals in terms of future earnings and firm value (Ross, 1977).  
Firms’ responses to product recalls differ. The extant literature (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000; Laufer 
and Coombs, 2006) classifies firms’ responses to product recalls into four groups: denial, forced 
compliance (involuntary recall), voluntary recall, and ‘super-effort’. Broadly, denial and involuntary 
recall fall under the category of passive responses, while voluntary recall and super-effort are proactive 
responses.  
In a proactive response, a firm that discovers a product defect, either through internal inspections 
or external sources, releases a voluntary product recall. Kumar and Schmitz (2011) state that in 2009, 
the US Consumer Product Safety Commission recorded 465 voluntary product recalls involving 229.6 
million product units. Voluntary recalls are released prior to any safety incidents or concerns being 
reported by consumers.  In 2016, for example, Apple announced a voluntary recall of millions of its 
two prong AC wall plugs, after it became aware of their potential to break, causing an electric shock 
(BBC News, 2016).  
A passive response, conversely, involves delaying the recall process or shifting the blame to other 
supply chain members, such as distributors, wholesalers and/or suppliers. Firms are particularly 
motivated to adopt a passive response when they discover a serious and pervasive product defect where 
they cannot profitably repair or replace all defective products. In these situations, companies may 
attempt to deceive consumers about unobserved quality attributes, hoping that the issues remain 
undetectable (Zhao et al., 2013). Consequently, firms that adopt a passive recall strategy tend to issue 
recall announcements much later, compared to proactive companies, often after serious complaints, 
injuries or even death to consumers (Chen et al., 2009). 
The current evidence as to which product recall strategy is penalized with a higher negative 
abnormal stock return is mixed. Zhao et al. (2013) found stock markets in China reacted significantly 
more negatively to passive recalls. Their findings suggest that in China, investors perceive companies 
who adopt a proactive approach to product recalls as socially more responsible. This is in line with 
Margolis et al. (2007), who posit that a proactive approach enhances consumers’ confidence in the 
firms’ products and helps firms to recover sooner. Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) argue that a proactive 
approach is seen by consumers and investors as a signal of corporate responsibility, even when that 
event leads to reduced cash flows that may devalue a firm. In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) found that 
proactive recall strategies have a more negative effect on a firm’s financial value than passive 
strategies. While the extant literature is mixed, most research suggests taking a proactive approach will 
be less punitive.  Thus, we hypothesize: 
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H3: A passive product recall strategy will result in more negative abnormal returns than a 
proactive product recall strategy. 
2.4. Effect of hazard 
The hazard that recalled products pose to consumers varies between different recalls (e.g. Ahmed 
et al., 2002; Ni et al., 2014). Federal departments and previous research classify product hazard in 
various ways. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) applies a three-level classification to 
recalls based on product hazard (Food and Drug Administration, 2014). Class I refers to dangerous or 
defective products that could cause serious health problems or death; Class II refers to recalls where 
products might cause a temporary health problem, or pose only a slight threat of a serious nature; and 
Class III refers to recalls where products are unlikely to cause any adverse health reaction, but violate 
FDA labelling or manufacturing laws. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) applied this classification to 
distinguish between severities of drug-related recalls.  
For the assessment of hazard in automotive sector, Crafton et al. (1981) and Reilly and Hoffer 
(1983) developed recall classifications for the severity level of vehicle recalls, when investigating the 
impact of automotive recalls on consumer demand. Their classification labelled minor problems, such 
as mislabelled or missing placards and tyre-related difficulties, as a Type I recall; Type II recalls 
considered intermediate problems such as defective windshield wipers or problems with carburettor 
brackets; while Type III were recalls due to severe safety hazards, such as loss of steering and braking 
functions or early failure of an axle shaft. 
Empirically, the effect of hazard on manufacturers, using cross-sectorial studies is yet to be tested. 
Given the variation in hazard levels, investors may react differently to recalls where faulty products 
pose a risk of severe impact to the health or even the death of consumers, as opposed to those where 
there are unlikely to be any adverse effects.  We offer three arguments for this: First, firms would 
normally send a signal to the investors and public about the level of hazard posed by the product to be 
recalled. We anticipate that, irrespective of industry, investors would associate increased levels of 
hazard, leading to serious personal injury or death, as a signal of more serious, costly, and difficult to 
resolve problems. Such problems may result in the loss of market share, decreased profitability, 
damaged reputation and lengthy lawsuits (Zhao et al., 2013). 
Second, due to loss aversion, investors’ interpretation of a product recall signal that is linked to the 
greater hazard, results in greater stock depreciation. This reaction is rooted in the notion of loss 
aversion, which suggests that change for the worse is perceived in people’s minds larger than an 
equivalent change for better (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005). 
Third, as posited by Ni et al. (2014), product recall announcements linked to serious hazard are 
likely to receive substantially more media coverage. The FDA’s and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC) websites are regularly updated with a plethora of product recalls with low levels 
of hazard, which never find their way into mainstream media. However, the newsworthy nature of 
recalls linked to serious injuries or death, is more likely to be reported by the media (Barber and Odean, 
2008). Therefore, as argued by Ni et al. (2014, p. 314): “product recall announcements for a more 
severe product safety issue will receive greater media attention, leading to greater disutility by 
stakeholders.” Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H4: A higher level of hazard will lead to a greater reduction in stock price. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In line with other research that examined the impact of product recalls on shareholder wealth (cf. 
Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Zhao et al., 2013; Ni et al., 2014), we used the event study methodology. In 
the following section we describe the data collection and analysis procedures. 
3.1. Data 
The process of identifying product recall announcements started with a free text search using the 
Factiva database focused on the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) - All Sources. This included its US, 
European and Asian printed editions, plus the online edition. Use of the WSJ as a source for recall 
announcements is in line with other studies that used the event study methodology (e.g. Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2003). 
The search covered a ten year period from 2005 until 2014. The key search word used was 
“recall*”, which yielded articles containing words such as “recall”, “recalls”, “recalled” or “recalling”. 
Each article/announcement was screened to identify the nature of the recall and whether it was germane 
to product recalls. In this process we eliminated articles/announcements with the following 
characteristics: 
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• Articles/announcements which reported the same information made in an earlier 
announcement, unless new information was disclosed. Thus, only the first announcement of a 
product recall was taken into consideration; 
• Articles/announcements related to privately owned companies, as there would be no publicly 
traded shares; and 
• Articles/announcements and earnings pre-announcements where product recalls were 
mentioned. Product recalls can influence earnings expectations (Bowen et al., 1992), as they 
contain factors that can bias the perceptions of a firm’s performance.  
  
The final sample consisted of 296, non-contaminated (i.e. no other recalls within the event 
window), product recall announcements, comprised of 150 recalls (50.7%) from automotive supply 
chain manufacturers; followed by 72 recalls from manufacturers in pharmaceutical supply chains 
(24.3%), 21 in food (7.1%), 20 in electronics (6.8%), 9 from toy (3.0%) and 24 (8.1%) from other 
supply chains.  Following the sample selection, we developed a cross-industrial classification of hazard 
levels. This was necessary for testing H4, given that the selected announcements spanned multiple 
industries. We started the process by reviewing the classifications of three main US government 
regulation agencies:  
• The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) responsible for consumer products; 
• The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which regulates consumer products encompassing 
food, pharmaceuticals, medical devices and cosmetics; and  
• The National Highway Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA), responsible for regulating the 
automotive industry.  
 
We further reviewed regulatory bodies in other countries and industries and consolidated these in 
the following way (see Table 1): 
• Class I involves recalls that could lead to death or severe injury; 
• Class II comprises recalls that may cause a temporary health problem or a minor to moderate 
injury; and  
• Class III is composed of defects that are not likely to have health or safety threats, but breach 
the legislation.  
 
Table 1: Hazard level classification across industry 
 
Automotive Pharmaceutical & Food Toy & Electronics 
Class I 
Death or severe injury caused by 
road accidents or fire, or risks that 
can be devastating 
Dangerous or defective products 
that predictably could cause serious 
health problems or death 
Death or severe injury caused by 
choking or exploding, etc., or 
predictably could cause serious 
health problems 
Class II 
Minor or moderate injury caused by 
road accidents or fire 
Products that might cause a 
temporary health problem, or pose 
only a slight threat of a serious 
nature 
Minor or moderate injury or adverse 
health reaction 
Class III 
Defects that are not causing any 
road accidents or fires  
Products that are unlikely to cause 
any adverse health reaction, but that 
violate FDA labelling or 
manufacturing laws 
Defects that are unlikely to cause 
any adverse health reaction or 
safety-related risks 
    
3.2. Event Study Method 
In order to determine the impact of product recalls on shareholder wealth, we utilized the event 
study methodology (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Hendricks and Singhal, 2003; Eilert et al., 2017). 
This methodology utilizes daily stock returns to estimate the abnormal share price changes due to 
product recall announcements. It takes into consideration both industry and systematic risks, while also 
estimating investors’ reactions to specific events (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997). 
It assumes that an efficient market immediately reacts when an event that could change a stock price 
value is announced. The method has been previously applied in the fields of operations and supply 
chain management, marketing, information technology and accounting, to examine phenomena such as 
the increase in capital expenditure (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985), new product introduction 
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(Chaney et al., 1991), strategic alliance or acquisitions (Chan et al., 1997), supply chain glitches 
(Hendricks and Singhal, 2003), and innovative IT investments (Dos Santos et al., 1993).  
We adopted this method in line with Hendricks and Singhal (2003), Zhao et al. (2013) and Ni et 
al. (2014), who used a modified version of Fama et al. (1969), to evaluate the daily stock returns. 
Appendix A provides an overview of the method used. The following section contains the results.  
4. RESULTS 
4.1. The Financial Impact of Product Recalls 
The results from the event study are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the daily 
abnormal return during the event window of 296 product recall announcements. It demonstrates that on 
announcement day (Day 0), the mean abnormal return is -1.34%, while the cumulative mean abnormal 
return over the 3-day event period is -1.87%. As shown in Table 2, there are statistically significant 
results for mean, median and percentage of negative abnormal return on Day -1 and Day 0, while the 
abnormal return on Day 1 is not significant at the 5% level.  The negative abnormal return on days -1 
and 0 is in line with the results of other product recall studies using the methodology (e.g. Ahmed et al., 
2002; Chu et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2013). However, the magnitude of the negative abnormal return in 
our study (i.e. -1.87%), is significantly higher than in previous studies that examined more than one 
industry (e.g. Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Pruitt and Peterson, 1986; Chu et al., 2005). 
 
Table 2: Abnormal returns for 296 product recalls announcements - event period from day -1 to 
day 1 
 
Day -1 Day 0 Day 1 
Event Period 
(Day -1 to Day 1) 
Mean abnormal return -0.30% -1.34% -0.23% -1.87% 
t-statistic -3.04 -2.96 -1.44 -4.21 
Median abnormal return -0.11% -0.25% -0.01 -0.222% 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test Z-
statistic 
-1.726 -2.049 -.694 -2.554 
Abnormal returns negative (%) 55.74% 58.78% 52.03% 61.82% 
 
Table 2 indicates that the results support H1 that investors react negatively to product recall 
announcements. This results in a significant (t=4.21) cumulative abnormal return during the event 
window, and a negative impact on shareholder wealth. Table 3 shows the Dollar change in the stock 
price for the product recall announcements in this study.   
 
Table 3: Description of Dollar change in stock price for the 296 product recall announcements 
Mean -US$362.6m 
Median -US$55.7m 
S.D. US$2,564.4m 
Maximum US$5,840.4m 
Minimum -US$37,250.4m 
 
From Table 3 it can be determined that the average Dollar loss over the event period (day -1 > day 
1) is US$ 362.6 million.  
4.2. The Effects of Industry, Recall Strategy and Hazard on Abnormal Stock Returns 
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 shows the descriptive, cross-tabulated results for both industry and hazard level. The 
figure in parenthesis is the proportion of hazard level results within the industry. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive results of industry and hazard classification 
Industry Class I Class II Class III Unclassified Total 
Automotive 4 (2.67%) 12 (8.00%) 125 (83.33%) 9 (6.00%) 150 
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Pharmaceutical 24 (33.33%) 25 (34.73%) 15 (20.83%) 8 (11.11%) 72 
Food 4 (19.05%) 7 (33.33%) 6 (28.57%) 4 (19.05%) 21 
Electronics - 5 (25.00%) 13 (65.00%) 2 (10.00%) 20 
Toys 6 (66.67%) - - 3 (33.33%) 9 
Miscellaneous 8 (33.33%) 6 (25.00%) 8 (33.33%) 2 (8.34%) 24 
 
Table 4 shows that recalls from manufacturers in automotive supply chains are the largest 
proportion of recalls within the sample. Pharmaceutical recalls are the next largest number (n=72) and 
they comprise one third of recalls for the most severe form (Class I). 
4.2.2. Effects of Industry 
The statistical results for Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) by industry are 
presented in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Statistical results of cumulative average abnormal return by industry 
Industry N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
p-value  
(t-value) 
Automotive 150 -0.0078 0.0210 0.0017 0.000 (-4.536) 
Pharmaceutical 72 -0.0460 0.1408 0.0166 0.007 (-2.774) 
Food 21 -0.0016 0.0185 0.0040 0.692 (-0.402) 
Electronics  20 -0.0024 0.0182 0.0041 0.565 (-0.586) 
Toy 9 -0.0258 0.0713 0.0238 0.309 (-1.085) 
Miscellaneous 24 -0.0395 0.0788 0.0191 0.055 (-2.066) 
 
From Table 5 it can be seen from the mean results that the manufacturers in pharmaceutical supply 
chains have the highest CAAR during the event period (day -1 > day 1), followed by miscellaneous 
(mean= -0.0395) and the toy supply chains (mean= -0.0258). However, only the automotive (p= 0.000, 
t= -4.536) and pharmaceutical industries (p= 0.007, t= -2.774) underwent significant changes to share 
prices. In order to check for statistically significant differences between groups (cf. Hendricks and 
Singhal, 2003), we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA). The ANOVA indicated that there was 
a statistically significant difference between groups (p= 0.014), indicating that the CAAR was different 
between sectors. Thus, H2 (The reduction in stock price related to product recalls will have industry-
specific impacts) is supported. 
4.2.3. Effects of Recall Strategy 
The impact of product recall strategy (i.e. proactive or passive), on CAAR is captured in Table 6. 
From the table, it can be determined that passive recalls have a CAAR that is statistically significantly 
different compared to the market. This indicates that manufacturers that adopted a passive strategy 
suffered a greater loss in share price compared to those that adopted a proactive strategy. The results of 
the ANOVA (p= 0.372) indicate there is no statistically significant difference between recall strategy 
types, potentially indicating there is some overlap in the distributions for each strategy.  
 
Table 6: Statistical results of cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) by recall strategy 
 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
p-value  
(t-value) 
Proactive 98 -0.011 0.068 0.007 0.098 (-1.670) 
Passive 136 -0.025 0.091 0.008 0.002 (-3.222) 
N/A 62 -0.016 0.047 0.006 0.011 (-2.636) 
Total 296 -0.019 0.076 0.004 0.000 (-4.214) 
 
These results suggest that H3 is not supported. This may be due to the wider spread of samples for 
proactive recalls (both positive and negative share price changes), while passive recall samples are 
more concentrated in the negative direction. Thus, it can be posited that only passive recalls will be 
punished by the stock market. Conversely, for proactive recalls, the financial consequences can be both 
positive and negative. 
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4.2.4. Effects of Hazard Level 
Table 7 shows the results of the CAAR by hazard level. 
 
Table 7: Statistical results of cumulative average abnormal return by hazard level 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error p-value (t-value) 
Class I 46 -0.0672 0.1536 0.0226 0.005 (-2.965) 
Class II 55 -0.0107 0.0260 0.0035 0.004 (-3.053) 
Class III 167 -0.0054 0.0220 0.0017 0.002 (-3.173) 
N/A 28 -0.0341 0.1208 0.0228 0.147 (-1.494) 
Total 296 -0.0187 0.0764 0.0228 0.000 (-4.214) 
 
As is evident from Table 7, the CAAR of the stock will become more negative as the hazard level 
increases – i.e. from a Class III recall through to a Class I recall. Overall, there is a significant 
difference according to hazard level (p= 0.000).  
We conducted a multiple comparison analysis, which determined there is no significant difference 
(p= 0.643) between Class II and Class III recalls; a statistically significant difference is detected 
between Class I and Class II recalls (p =0.000), and between Class I and Class III recalls (p= 0.000). 
Therefore, it can be posited that the stock market reacts differently to hazard level, with more 
hazardous events leading to greater reductions in share price. The results of the analysis provide 
support to H4 (A higher level of hazard will lead to a greater reduction in stock price). 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study we investigate the key characteristics of manufacturer firms’ product recalls on the 
stock market reaction. In Table 8 we present the hypotheses within this study and whether they were 
supported or unsupported. 
 
Table 8: Summary of tested hypothesis and their empirical support  
No. Hypothesis Supported? 
1 A product recall announcement will generate a negative stock market reaction. Supported 
2 
The reduction in stock price related to product recalls will have industry-specific 
impacts. 
Supported 
3 
A passive product recall strategy will result in more negative abnormal returns than 
a proactive product recall strategy 
Unsupported 
4 A higher level of hazard will be associated with more severe market penalty. Supported 
 
The contributions of this study are twofold. First, the results of the study revealed a significant 
negative stock market reaction to product recalls, confirming H1. The direction of the stock market 
reaction on days -1 and 0 is in line with previous literature. However, the magnitude of the reaction (i.e. 
-1.87%) in our study is significantly higher than in previous studies, where more than one industry was 
studied, for example -0.81% on day -1 (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985) and -0.76% on days -1 and 0 (Pruitt 
and Peterson, 1986) based on US data, and lower when comparing to Zhao et al.’s (2013) findings of -
2.21% based on data from China. As this study is based on global data, the result of -1.87% is within 
this range and possibly reflects the impact of both developed and developing countries. 
Second, we provide further granularity in the relationship between product recalls and 
shareholder’s wealth by examining the effects of industry, recall strategy and hazard. Our findings 
indicated that there were differences in the impact between different sectors.  Both, manufacturers in 
automotive (t= -4.536) and pharmaceutical supply chains (t= -2.774) had significant negative abnormal 
returns. This difference is also significant (p= 0.001) with pharmaceutical showing more variability 
when compared to automotive (SD= 14.174% vs. 2.101%). We suggest there are two distinct reasons 
behind this. For manufacturers in pharmaceutical supply chains, one third of the total recalls were for 
the most severe type of recall, i.e. those likely to cause death. They often result not only in the need for 
a complete drug withdrawal and consequent loss of market, but also in very high litigation costs. For 
example, Merck’s legal costs related to Vioxx withdrawal were estimated to exceed $7.7bn 
(Bloomberg News, 2010).  For the recalls in automotive supply chains, investors may perceive that the 
recall is indicative of a more costly and pervasive problem, with the recalled product being shared 
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between different automotive firms due to supply base over-rationalisation (cf. Choi and Linton, 2011) 
and sharing of the same supplier (Yan et al., 2015).  For example, Takata was a shared supplier of 
multiple automotive OEM’s whose airbag recall impacted more than 20 manufacturers. By comparison, 
toy recalls were not found to be statistically significant. We suggest this was due to only having four 
firms in our sample. Whilst it is logical to expect food recalls to have a significant impact, we suggest 
that due to diversification of brands and range of stock keeping units within food manufacturers’ 
portfolios, the results are to be expected.  
Furthermore, rooted in signalling theory, we also examined the effects of recall strategy. The 
results of the analysis showed no statistically significant difference between the abnormal returns of 
passive and proactive recalls. Moreover, the effects of proactive recall strategies can have mixed 
financial impact. This is an important finding and it is in contrast to the extant literature (e.g. and 
Davidson and Worrell, 1992; Zhao et al., 2013), which suggests significant differences between passive 
and proactive recalls as well as passive recall strategies being more punitive than proactive. Our finding 
suggests that manufacturers who adopt proactive recall strategy may not always elicit positive 
responses from the investors. This suggests that investors may not always see the proactive recall 
strategy in the same light as consumers, potentially interpreting them as a signal of more severe product 
hazard, potential financial damage or, as shown in the study of Hora et al. (2011) - longer recall times.  
The effects of hazard have been largely left out of examinations of product recall announcements 
on cross-sectorial samples. We have shown that higher hazards lead to greater negative abnormal 
returns, and such plays an important role in the directionality and the magnitude of stock price 
movement for three key reasons;  a) severe hazards, such as consumers’ death, are indicative of 
products that require costly rectification or even a complete withdrawal from an entire supply chain;  b) 
the more severe the hazard, the higher the expected litigation costs and; c) extensive media coverage of 
recalls associated with severe hazard is resulting in greater disutility by stakeholders. Our findings 
extend the findings of Ni et al. (2014), Ahmed et al. (2002) and Thomsen and McKenzie (2001), 
showing that irrespective of the structural position of a firm in a supply chain, investors will react more 
strongly to recalls that are associated with the higher risk of injury or death.   
5.1. Managerial implications 
Given the global nature of supply chains, supply base rationalization, tougher regulations and 
economic pressures, product recalls will remain ubiquitous. It is unlikely that a firm could change 
sector to one that was less sensitive to recall announcements, unlike the pharmaceutical and automotive 
sectors. Firms do, however, need to be transparent and proactive when recalling products, as this can 
result in minimization of short-term as well as long-term financial consequences. Consumers and 
shareholders are interested in whether a firm cares. The results around hazard and sector also suggest 
that firms need to be incredibly rigorous in ensuring the safety and quality of their products in various 
stages, from product development, sourcing, manufacturing and distribution. The manufacturers should 
also be motivated to play an active role, not only in ensuring internal quality standards, but also to 
proactively manage their supply network partners.  
5.2. Future research 
This work examined four sectors; future research could examine a broader range to unveil further 
sectoral differences and seek to examine whether the source of the recall (e.g. focal firm, partner, 
supply chain) leads to a greater or lesser impact upon share price. Further, considering the impact of 
severe hazard on shareholder value, research is needed to improve strategies and quality procedures to 
mitigate the occurrence of hazard.  
In our research, we focussed on major recall announcements published by news agencies.  While 
this is important, the vast majority of recalls do not gain such press attention.  However,  agencies such 
as the US CPSC and NHTSA provide data on all recalls reported within their area of responsibility.  
Further research could evaluate the effects of the full range of recall announcements, to establish 
further granularity of the financial implications on shareholder values. 
Finally, the research could be extended to include other potential mediating factors, such as, the 
effects of branded and non branded products.  For example: do firms with strong brand loyalty suffer 
lower – or perhaps higher – decreases in share price? 
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF THE EVENT STUDY METHOD 
In line with Hendricks and Singhal (2003), we used a modified version of the Fama et al. (1969) 
market model to estimate the daily share price returns:  
 
                                       (1) 
Where Rit is the return of stock i on day t, Rmt is the market return on day t (calculated using the 
local market index of each stock i). αi is the intercept of the relationship for stock i, βi is the slope of the 
relationship for stock i with the market return Rmt, and εit is the error term for stock i on day t which 
captures the part of Rit that cannot be explained by market movements and captures the effect of firm-
specific information. For each company, the change in the intercept , the change in the slope  
of the relationship, and the variance of the error term εit were estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression over a 190-day estimation period. The event window spanned three days to include 
one day prior to the announcement date (-1) and one day following the announcement date (+1). This 
was done to both effectively measure the market reaction and control for confounding  effects  
(McWilliams  and  Siegel  1997).  The  estimation  period  (day -201, -12) was ended 10 trading days 
before the event window to avoid any potential bias caused by the data used to estimate the parameters 
of the market model (Hendricks and Singhal 2003). The abnormal return for stock i on day t is the 
difference between the actual price of stock i on day t (Rit) and the expected return of stock i on day t 
. It is defined as: 
 
  (2) 
From Fama et al. (1969), the average abnormal return across N sample observations of the sample 
of firms at day t is described as: 
 
      (3) 
Where N is the number of sample companies on day t. In this study, N=296. The cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) over the time period (t1,…,t2) is the sum of AARt and is expressed as: 
 
     (4) 
In order to determine whether the abnormal return is different to zero at a statistically significant 
level, we first standardize the abnormal return by dividing the abnormal return (AARit) by , its 
estimated standard deviation: 
 
      (5) 
The test statistic (TS) employed to test the statistical significance of the average abnormal return 
for day t is thus defined as: 
 
      (6) 
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To evaluate the multiple day test statistics, assume that abnormal returns are independent and 
identically distributed across time (Hendricks and Singhal 2003). Thus, the t-test over multiple days 
(t1,…t2), TSc, is presented as: 
 
                (7) 
